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Abstract:
In what ways, if at all, do past ideologies shape the values of subsequent 
generations of citizens? Are public attitudes in one period shaped by the 
discourses and constructions of an earlier generation of political leaders? 
Using Thatcherism – one variant of the political New Right of the 1980s – 
as the object of our enquiries, this paper explores the extent to which an 
attitudinal legacy is detectable amongst the citizens of the UK some 40 
years after Margaret Thatcher first became Prime Minister. Our paper, 
drawing on survey data collected in early 2019 (n = 5,781), finds that 
younger generations express and seemingly embrace key tenets of her 
and her governments’ philosophies.  Yet at the same time, they are keen 
to describe her government’s policies as having ‘gone too far’. Our 
contribution throws further light on the complex and often covert 
character of attitudinal legacies. One reading of the data suggests that 
younger generations do not attribute the broadly Thatcherite values that 
they hold to Thatcher or Thatcherism since they were socialised 
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1: Past Studies of Thatcherite Values: What Do We Know?
One of the questions to which political scientists devoted considerable attention during the period 
from the late-1980s was the extent to which the governments led by Margaret Thatcher contributed 
to a ‘Thatcherite’ attitudinal shift. In this paper we reassess the relationship between ‘Thatcherism’ 
as an ideology and the values and attitudes on key topics and issues held by members of the British 
public in the 21st Century. We start by discussing the attitudes which have come to represent 
‘Thatcherism’, before addressing how dominant ideologies of the past continue to resonate in 
subsequent decades. We then explore the impact of Thatcherism on citizens’ attitudes, noting that 
as time has passed and as better data sets have become available, so the evidence for a Thatcherite 
attitudinal legacy has mounted. This fresh data suggests that the answer to the question ‘Did 
Thatcher alter attitudes?’ is time-variant – in all likelihood because it is linked to questions of 
political socialisation exhibiting a cohort-like temporality (Grasso et al 2019a and b). The second half 
of the paper explores which social groups hold what may be thought of as ‘Thatcherite’ attitudes, 
values and desires forty years after she was first elected.1 This section outlines the methodology we 
deploy and presents the core findings. Above all, it discusses the implications of the reputational 
legacies we reveal for our understanding of Thatcherism in the 2020s.  We conclude with a broader 
reflection of the ways in which political leadership can, in some cases, shape popular attitudes 
decades later (see also Farrall et al 2020c). 
We hold the view that Thatcherism remains important given its enduring policy legacy and the 
profound influence of the changes it initiated on UK society, institutions (social, economic and 
political), political discourse and voting patterns (Albertson and Stepney, 2019). Thatcher’s legacies 
would appear to be stubborn, emotive and agenda-setting in both the normative and discursive 
senses. Moreover, the policies and normative positions attributed to her and her governments on a 
1 Given the place of Thatcherism in the wider 1980s New Right movement (and which encompassed the USA, 
Australia and New Zealand amongst other countries) a discussion of ‘Thatcherite values’ inevitably invokes a 
discussion of the extent to which these were similar to those attitudes and values in those countries. At 
present there is insufficient data to make assessments of the attitudinal change in many of these countries. 
Accordingly, we focus herein on Britain and Thatcherism, but accept that similar findings, albeit with some 
variations, may hold in those other countries which embraced the New Right during the 1980s.

































































series of key decisions are frequently invoked in popular and media debates. Unlike, arguably, earlier 
or more recent Prime Ministers, Thatcher still haunts contemporary British politics, lying behind 
many of the events of the years since she left office in 1990.
This paper seeks both to review and reassess what is known about Thatcherite attitudes. Above all, 
we seek to establish whether and to what extent the British electorate can be seen to have become 
Thatcherite over time (section 1). Our review of the literature (section 2) suggests that the initial 
dismissal of Thatcher’s influence has, over time, and as data sets and analyses have become more 
sophisticated, increasingly been questioned. On the basis of this review, we turn to questions of 
methodology, describing the survey we commissioned to mark the 40th anniversary of Thatcher’s 
first general election victory which was undertaken in early 2019 (section 3). We then present the 
findings from this survey, showing in the process that Thatcherite values have become deeply 
embedded in British value structures (section 4). In section 5 we deal with reputational legacies, 
before providing a discussion and conclusion in section 6. Our contribution to these previous studies 
is to explore the extent to which British citizens have come to hold aspirations and desires consistent 
with key elements of a Thatcherite instinct or disposition.  
 
1.1: What are Thatcherite Attitudes?
Before one can establish whether or not Thatcherism changed social attitudes, one has to establish 
why (in and through what mechanisms) this political doctrine may have served to change social 
attitudes. Next one has to have some idea about the sorts of attitudes which it may have changed, 
and the direction of these changes. One also has to establish some sort of temporal dimension too; 
the attitudes of adults do not change easily. Let us consider each of these in turn. 
We think that there are good reasons to assume that political leadership, especially if maintained 
over a reasonably long period of time, can and does effect social and political attitudes (see Grasso 
et al 2019a, 2019b, Gray et al 2019). One strand of research has argued that political elites influence 
each other. As such, even if Thatcherism did not affect the views of the electorate during the 1980s 
(Crewe, 1989, McAllister and Mughan, 1987), her position did influence thinking within the Labour 
Party, which, over a long period shifted to the right in response to her electoral success, the changes 
she made to the economic and social contexts, and the threat posed by the creation of the Social 
Democratic Party (Hay 1999; Heffernan, 2000). In a similar vein, Curtice (2009) argued that Thatcher 
influenced the Labour Party, but that the wider shift in public values which she sought was actually 
achieved by Blair. 
Gamble (1988) summarises the tenets of the New Right (of which Thatcherism is one variant) as 
being that state intervention did not work, alternatives to the market were flawed, government 
failure was more common than market failure and lastly that individual citizens’ rights were violated 
by anything other than the most minimal of states. The New Right was a flexible combination and 
synthesis of two strands of rightwing philosophy, which emphasized authority and control on the 
one hand, and liberty and individual choice on the other (see Gamble 1988, Ch 2, Hay, 1996, Ch 7 on 
the origins of these strands of thought).  It is beyond dispute that the Thatcher administrations 
aimed their policies at re-drawing the public-private boundary and reducing the role of the state via 
the privatization of a range of key services that had been taken into state-ownership since the late 
1940s (Gamble, 1988:7). Gamble goes on to recount the principal objectives of privatization as 
portrayed by Thatcher: greater freedom of choice; greater efficiency; the reduction of the Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirement; reduction in the costs of public sector pay; the removal of key 

































































decisions from the political arena altogether; increased share ownership amongst the citizenry; the 
promotion of liberalization and competition; an increase in active citizenry and a reduction of state 
dependency (1988:11). To this Leys (2001:3) adds the desire to make the state serve business 
interests, remodel the formers’ internal operations to become more like the latter’s and to reduce 
the government’s exposure to political pressure from the electorate. Marwick (2003:241) notes also 
that Thatcherism expressed overt hostility toward 1960s style ‘permissiveness’. 
Culled from a range of sources (see inter alia Levitas, 1986, Hay, 1996, Hayes, 1994, Gamble 1988, 
Crewe, 1988, Crewe and Searing, 1988, Russell et al, 1992), the following, have all been cited to be 
some of the values which distinguished Thatcherism from the stances taken by both Conservative 
and Labour politicians who came before her:
 Governmental Role in Society: including a distrust of government, anti-welfare state, local 
government and anti-comprehensive education sentiments, anti-wealth redistribution and 
(associated with this) anti-taxation.
 Social and Moral Conservatism: including support of ‘traditional’ values, pro-family values 
(especially towards the concept of ‘traditional’ nuclear families and pro-physical discipline), 
the fostering of obedience and respect (which was associated with being ‘tough-minded’ on 
wrong-doing and crime), being anti-immigration, holding ‘nationalistic’ values, being anti-gay 
rights, sexual permissiveness, pornography, and against freely-available abortions.
 Economic Outlook: including being anti-trade unions, anti-nationalisation, pro-free trade, 
pro-enterprise and in favour of self-reliance.
Some of these elements may also attract support from the left (few politicians are pro-pornography, 
for example), and there have arguably been elements of overlap and convergence between them on 
many issues (Hay, 1999). Thatcherism’s success, as many have pointed to, was to be able to manage 
at a narrative and policy level, a flexible synthesis of these ‘instincts’ (Hay, 1996). In which direction 
and at what sorts of speeds ought we to expect to see attitudinal change? If Thatcherism were to 
have been broadly accepted by the electorate, one would have expected to see, over time, attitudes 
move towards increased levels of agreement with the Thatcherite position. In other cases, one might 
have expected to see little change, since Thatcher was articulating values which had seen her 
elected in the first place. Similarly, one might expect to see Thatcher’s period in office being 
associated with ‘halting’ or slowing some of the attitudes she opposed (for example, pro-gay rights 
sentiments). Relatedly, there will have been long-term attitudinal shifts which neither she nor 
anyone else would have been able to halt; attitudes towards women working in the economy, equal 
rights for those members of society previously discriminated against and the increasing social 
acceptance of divorce, for example. Therefore, the speeds at which such changes occurred might 
differ and fluctuate for a number of reasons. First of all, as some have noted before (Green, 1999, 
Fieldhouse, 1995), the attitudes which Thatcher articulated can be traced to the 1950s and 1960s 
and were already held by a reasonably large proportion of the electorate. In addition, it must be 
remembered that Thatcher only polled around 40% of the votes in the General Elections between 
1979 and 1987 (43.9% in 1979, 42.4% in 1983 and 42.2% in 1987), and one ought not to expect huge 
levels of support for any specific value she promoted. Finally, given that the formation of attitudes 
takes place early in an individual’s life, (Mannheim, 1928) processes of inter-generational 
replacement may mean that considerable periods of time may pass before attitudinal shifts start to 
appear in surveys. Thus social attitudes which might be thought of as ‘Thatcherite’ would take time 
to filter through, either because Thatcherism was a response to these pre-existing shifts, or because 

































































her message and some of the values it contained took time to become embedded in wider social and 
political cultures.
2: How and Why Might Past Ideologies Shape Subsequent Attitudes?
Studies of the continued relevance of past ideologies are interesting since attitudinal shifts in the 
general population (regardless of how these are initiated) may have consequences for the policies 
which subsequent governments and political parties feel they can legitimately pursue (and also 
‘need’ to pursue if they are to curry favour with the electorate, Downs, 1957). A ‘hardening’ of 
popular attitudes towards crime may result in governments and political parties trying to produce 
‘tougher’ policies both rhetorically and in actual application to demonstrate that they are responding 
to public concerns. Similarly, attitudes on one topic may, over time, produce changes in feelings 
about other topics. For example, a hardening of attitudes towards ‘offenders’ may pave the way for 
a later hardening of attitudes towards other rule-breakers (such as excluded school children or 
people who are perceived to be exploiting welfare payments). If media and popular discourses 
conceptually link or draw connections between groups of people, then this pattern may be 
consolidated further. In this respect it is important to recognise the important role attitudes can play 
in the establishing of a political legacy. As we shall see below, age-period-cohort analysts (Grasso et 
al, 2019a, 2019b, Gray et al 2019) have been suggesting that long-term shifts in attitudes can indeed 
be a long-term consequence of political leadership. 
2.1: Did Thatcherism Alter Attitudes?
One of the earliest surveys of attitudes towards Thatcherism was conducted in Manchester by 
researchers at the University of Salford (Edgell and Duke, 1991). These surveys ran in late-1980 to 
early-1981 and again in late-1983 to early-1984, and found little by way of support for Thatcherite 
values. The surveys suggested that respondents wanted increases in spending and taxation (not 
decreases) with an attendant drop in support for spending on the armed services. The surveys also 
found large levels of support for local government (1991:81) although they did find some support for 
the idea that the power of trade unions needed to be curbed (however, trade unions were still seen 
as being needed, 1991:83). 
Some of the earliest forays into this topic conducted by political scientists were conducted by Crewe 
(see Crewe 1988, 1989). Crewe (1988) posed the question ‘has the electorate become Thatcherite?’, 
to which he answered ‘no’, pointing out that by some analyses the population was taking a ‘hard 
line’ on some issues before 1979 and that by 1987 was actually showing quite ‘anti’-Thatcherite 
sentiments. Crewe subsequently (1989) used data from a 1988 MORI poll and focused on the topic 
of self-reliance. This again suggested that not only was there little enthusiasm for this, if anything 
respondents were moving away from support for this idea (1989:247). Crewe and Searing (1988) 
further argued that there was little evidence that her ideology had gained much by way of popular 
support, and, in fact, the electorate had become less Thatcherite (1988:376). McAllister and Mughan 
(1987), using data from the British Election Studies for 1974-1983, found that an analysis of the 
October 1974, 1979 and 1983 general elections suggested there had been “little fundamental 
change in the electorate’s overall attitudinal structure” (1987:47). Studlar and McAllister (1992) 
extended these analyses to include the 1987 general election and came to very similar conclusions.

































































From this point onwards the data analyses started to become more sophisticated, with analysts 
tackling regional shifts, the notion of ‘political generations’ and examining longitudinal patterns from 
the British Election Studies dating back to 1963. Johnston and Pattie (1990), for example, 
demonstrated regional variations in public Thatcherite attitudes, but nevertheless concluded that 
“the Thatcherite project has failed, in that the majority of the electorate ... did not embrace its core 
values to any significant extent” (1990:492). Summarising this body of work, it appears that UK 
political scientists believed that Thatcher had had little impact on attitudes. Their collective 
endeavours had suggested that the electorate had remained resolutely unimpressed by much of her 
approach to the challenges which the country faced, and in many respects had started to lean away 
from her policies. 
However, a number of observations of these studies can be made. Crewe’s contributions were 
criticised by Hetzner (1999), who argued that Crewe’s key studies (1988 and 1989) did not include 
reference to periods before Thatcher’s time in office (thus failing to establish an adequate ‘base 
line’). Of more concern was the fact that many of the assessments were taken whilst Thatcher was 
still in office and hence needed to be seen as interim findings, rather than providing a definitive 
account. This observation is important in two respects. First, adults do not often dramatically change 
their values ‘overnight’, and as such long term trends need to be considered. Second, attitudinal 
change may be subject to ‘intergenerational replacement’ – i.e. that older generations (who may 
hold different values from younger generations) are more likely to die, and as such, leave the 
population or electorate. Such changes, however, may emerge slowly. These issues come to the fore 
when one considers that in the UK under eighteen year olds are not routinely surveyed in attitudinal 
surveys. For example, it was not until 1997 that those born in 1979 were eligible for inclusion in 
surveys. Similarly, those perhaps most affected by Thatcherite social attitudes and the new 
structures of institutions and thought which her governments brought about (born between, say the 
mid-1970s and mid-1990s) would not be eighteen until the very late 1980s and late 2010s.  
Hetzner (1999) also noted that just because there was a decline in support for various Thatcherite 
social and economic policies (Crewe, 1988, 1989) does not mean that respondents did not support 
her agenda; it might simply have been that they felt that enough had been done on that topic, a 
point which Crewe hints at too (1989:247). Hetzner points to the fact that decline in the popularity 
of privatisation came after the bulk of the sales had taken place (and there were, therefore, fewer 
entities which could be sold off, 1999:122-123). In this respect, whilst many analysts may have 
expected the surveys they used to show attitudinal changes in line with Thatcherite values, given 
that Thatcherism was (in part) a response to post-war social and economic changes (Dorling, 2014, 
Green 1999), an additional approach may have been to look for a Thatcherite impact in terms of 
slowing or halting of those attitudes and beliefs not in keeping with her philosophy.  In short, it 
might simply have been that Thatcherism arrested other long term trends (Tilley and Heath, 2007). 
2.2: Political Generations; Longer Time Series; New Data Sets
Russell et al (1992) extended the work by Johnston and Pattie (1990) and explored the possibility 
that Thatcherite values had effected first-time voters to a greater extent than other voters. This 
hypothesis was partially supported, although the results did not suggest any especially 
straightforward trends. For example, first time voters in 1983 were more left-wing in their attitudes 
towards law and order than either the 1979 or the 1987 first-time voters. Similar trends were 
observed for beliefs about private or public schools (with first-time voters being more left-wing). 
Attitudes towards egalitarianism (that is, pro-nationalisation, pro-trade unions and pro-

































































redistribution) showed a complex change, however. Whilst the first-time voters in the 1983 general 
election were still more left-wing than others in that election, they appeared to be less left-wing 
than first-time voters in 1974, 1979 and 1987 (p749-50). This ‘Thatcher effect’ Russell et al 
(1992:749) observed for unemployment, with the 1987 first-time voters being more right-wing than 
those in 1983 (p752). The same trend could also be seen for attitudes towards taxation (p753) and 
self-reliance (p753). Russell et al concluded that previous assessments failed to explore the role of 
political socialisation, which may produce what one might think of as intergenerational replacement 
(1992:754-55).
The next key development coincided with the fall of the Conservative Party at the 1997 General 
Election. By this point the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) had been running for almost 15 
years, and afforded a new opportunity to assess of the extent to which the population had become 
‘Thatcherite’. The BSAS provided data which was used to question the dominant view that 
Thatcher’s impact on attitudes was an extremely limited one. For example, Heath and Park (1997:6) 
found that the fall in identification with the Conservative Party was lowest for the youngest cohort 
(raising the question as to whether Thatcherism had appealed more to the younger, ‘1980s’ 
generation). They also found that those who grew up in the 1980s were more materialistic than their 
predecessors (Heath and Park, 1997:9). This same cohort (born after 1960, and socialised in the late-
1970s and 1980s) also thought inequality was ‘too big’ (Heath and Park, 1997:10), but possibly only 
because they were at that stage amongst the poorest in the labour market. Heath and Park 
concluded that the 1980s/Thatcher’s generation did not identify with the Tories (indeed they were 
less likely to identify with them, 1997:18), however there were signs of a shift towards materialism 
and a growing sense of disenchantment amongst this generation (1997:19). Curtice and Jowell 
(1997) found that between 1985 and 1996, fewer people in the BSAS agreed that governments 
ought to provide healthcare, provide a decent standard of living for the old, keep prices under 
control, help industry to grow, help low income families send their children to university, provide 
accommodation for the poor, reduce economic inequalities, help the unemployed maintain a decent 
standard of living, or provide jobs for people (p97); all of which suggest deeper shifts in public 
attitudes. 
One of the benefits of the BSAS series is its ability to track change over decades. Rowlingson et al 
(2010:10) show that the percentage agreeing that “governments ought to redistribute income” 
stood at 45% in 1987, rose slightly to 48% in 1991 and then fell to 36% in 2009. The percentage of 
people agreeing that the “government ought to spend more on benefits” fell from 55% in 1987 to 
27% in 2009. In this light, it appears that Thatcherite attitudes – which New Labour had ceased to 
contest - have asserted themselves in the decades since 1990. 
More recent studies have become more sophisticated still. The data sets used are more varied, the 
time frames longer and the idea of there being ‘political generations’ has become more thoroughly 
embedded in this approach. Tilley (2002), for example, has shown that younger generations tended 
to disassociate with the Conservative Party, but that this trend stopped and went into reverse in the 
1980s and 1990s (p129-30). Further work suggests that whilst feelings of national pride have 
declined, Thatcher was able to arrest some of this (Tilley and Heath, 2007:669). Compounding this, 
Tilley and Evans show that the generations which came of age during the 1930s, 1950s and 1980s (all 
period of conservative dominance) were all more conservative ones, even if these differences are 
only slight (2014:25). 
Building on the work of Sowell (2012), Grasso and colleagues (2019a, 2019b) test the ‘trickle-down’ 
theory  of social change. They argue that during the initial period of Thatcher’s rule, there was deep 
ideological contestation. Following this, political opponents and rival partisans internalised market 

































































liberalism as these became the new ‘rules of the game’. For the UK (alongside the USA, and Australia 
to a lesser extent), the 1980s were marked by a concentrated shift towards neo-liberal economic 
thinking. The term ‘trickle-down’ was employed in popular discussions of President Reagan’s 
administration and other laissez-fair capitalist economies. (Although the concept had originally first 
been used by US Democratic presidential candidate, William Bryan 1896, Sowell 2012). Essentially, 
the idea is that political discourse and ideas, as well as shaping organisations and institutional 
norms, will shape popular attitudes. They report that it indeed was the case that:  
“across eight of nine indicators, Thatcher’s Children are more right wing and authoritarian 
than the generation preceding them (Wilson/Callaghan’s Children). […] Blair’s Babies are 
also more right wing and authoritarian than this political generation, confirming that 
Thatcherite values were reproduced under New Labour, and become stronger and 
embedded in the generation that came of age after Thatcher’s time in office.” (Grasso, et al 
2019:14).
They go on to conclude that:
“there is an upward swing in right-authoritarian values from around the start of the years of 
birth of the Thatcherite political generation (that is, those born in 1959) at least up until the 
end of it (those born in 1976), and in several cases lasting well beyond. This suggests 
Thatcherite values were growing in strength among the cohort that became political adults 
during the Thatcher years.” (p14).
The authors argue that the results provide strong evidence of cohort effects. The data which they 
use (drawn from the BSAS) suggest that those cohorts growing up during prolonged periods of 
Conservative Party rule would appear to ‘absorb’ the values which these administrations promote. 
What is especially striking about these findings is that they suggest that these governments were 
able to ‘off-set’ the more socially liberal tendency often found amongst younger citizens. As such, 
they were able to show that the generation which grew up during Thatcher and Major’s time in 
office became a particularly conservative one. 
What we take from this more recent work is that with the emergence of longer time-series data it is 
clear that we need to revisit and, indeed, to reject that idea of earlier scholars that Thatcher and 
Thatcherism were unlikely to have any enduring attitudinal impact. This is not of course necessarily 
to suggest that Thatcher or Thatcherism ‘created’ these attitudes, but rather that her 
administrations (and perhaps those that followed, too) re-articulated them, gave an ideological 
coherence to them and helped to embed them into political discourse. Certainly this occurred at a 
specific moment in time and space that permitted these values to slowly, but surely percolate into 
the national consciousness and thinking. In this sense, ‘Thatcherite values’ are not simply a new or 
novel set of mores, but rather a (re)configuration of existing values supported by a unifying narrative 
embedded in the heart of a critique and prognosis of British society in the 1970s, and which was 
promoted in an unprecedented manner. As data sets with longer time series have started to be 
more rigorously analysed, so we have seen the emergence of the idea that the impact which she had 
was on the generation of people born in the 1960s though to the late-1970s and who grew up during 
the 1980s and 1990s. 

































































3: Measuring, Exploring and Assessing Thatcherism in 2019
Against this backdrop, which suggests that there is considerable – even growing - support for 
Thatcherite attitudes in the years since her time in office, we designed and undertook a survey 
aimed at assessing and identifying who held Thatcherite values in early 2019, some 40 years after 
the Winter of Discontent, the vote of no confidence in the Callaghan government and the election of 
Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979. Following a series of survey experiments and cognitive 
interviews to assess question-wording (see Farrall et al, 2020b), we commissioned an online 
stratified random sample survey on the contemporary relevance of Thatcherite values.2 The vast 
majority of interviews (n=5,581) were conducted online, with a further 200 face-to-face interviews 
with respondents identified as being low internet users. Fieldwork was conducted between mid-
January and mid-February 2019. The sample drawn was representative of Britain.  
3.1 Operationalising Thatcherite Values and Thatcherite Desires
We developed a model based on the two key streams of 1980s New Right thinking (Hayes, 1994, 
Hay, 1996) – namely neoliberalism (Figure One) and neo-conservativism (Figure Two).  Following 
Gamble (1988), Hay (1996), Levitas (1986) and Hayes (1994), we see these two strands of thinking as 
representing the two key ‘fault lines’ in Thatcherism, and indeed the 1980s New Right more 
generally. Both sets of items were asked as part of the same battery of questions, and all questions 
shared the same set of response codes.3
 
FIGURE ONE: NEO-LIBERAL ‘THATCHERITE’ VALUES
Item Wording Loadings
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth. .599
There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees’ working conditions and 
wages.
.667
Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems. .644
Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership. -.322
It would be better for everyone if we all paid less tax. .356
Welfare benefits should be reserved for only the extremely needy. .418
2 Online Invites were sent to members of four online panels. This spreads the fieldwork across panels to ensure 
a more presentative sample is drawn. In addition to BMG’s own panel, invitations were sent via panels 
organised by Respondi, Cint and Panelbase.
3 Which were Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree, and used for all 
questions discussed herein unless otherwise noted.

































































These items were factor analysed to form one battery of items measuring neo-liberal values. The 
KMO was .757, and the eigenvalue was 2.288.4  The factor loadings ranged from -.3225 to .667 and 
were all in the anticipated direction.
FIGURE TWO: NEO-CONSERVATIVE ‘THATCHERITE’ VALUES
Item Wording Loadings
Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional values. .666
For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. .604
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. .753
Schools should teach children to obey authority .681
The items in Figure Two were factor analysed to form one battery of neo-conservative items.  The 
KMO was .760, and the eigenvalue was 2.369.  The factor loadings ranged from .604 to .753.  In 
addition to these two indices, we measured what might be termed ‘Thatcherite Desires’; aspirations 
held by individual respondents which chimed with the ideals which the Thatcher governments 
promoted. We focused on three of these (owning one’s own business, owning one’s own home6 and 
sending one’s children to private schools), see Figure Three.
FIGURE THREE: ‘THATCHERITE’ DESIRES
Item Wording
One day, I would like to own my own business. [NOT asked of those who already owned their own 
businesses].
One day, I would like to buy my own home. [Asked of those who did not already own their own 
homes or who had shared ownership].
One day, I would like to send my children to a private school. [Asked of those who a had children 
and b) who were not already at private schools].
These three items, because of their different sample sizes (a consequence of some people already 
owning houses etc.), were not factor analysed, and are examined herein individually. The above 
three batteries are our dependent variables in regression analyses. Our modelling also included four 
other factors (Beliefs about Thatcherism; Social Nostalgia, Economic Nostalgia and Political 
Nostalgia), all of which are outlined below.
The Beliefs about Thatcherism battery (Figure Four) assessed respondents’ beliefs about the 
immediate and long-term effects of her government’s policies. These items were factor analysed to 
form one battery of items. The KMO was .890, and the eigenvalue was 4.465. The magnitude of 
factor loadings ranged from -.4677 to .894.
4 The KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) Test is a measure of how suited the data is for Factor Analysis. The test 
measures sampling adequacy for each variable in the model and for the complete model. KMO values range 
between 0 and 1. A rule of thumb for interpreting the statistic is that KMO values between 0.8 and 1 indicate 
the sampling is adequate, whilst those below 0.6 indicate the sampling is not adequate and that remedial 
action should be taken. 
5 This item was reverse coded, hence the negative value. 
6 Though easily forgotten, the promotion of home ownership was a core Thatcherite value and one that both 
chimed with and proved particularly appealing to certain sections of what might be termed the aspirant 
working class (see Hay 1992). 
7 Again, negatively loading items were reverse coded. 

































































FIGURE FOUR: BELIEFS ABOUT THATCHERISM
Item Wording Loadings
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Margaret 
Thatcher’s time as Prime Minister?
Margaret Thatcher made Britain Great again. .869
Margaret Thatcher was right to sell council houses to tenants. .576
Private companies run utilities like gas, electricity and water better than the 
government ever could.
.481
The social and economic changes since the 1980s have ensured a brighter future for 
all.
.715
Although there were some losers, overall the changes Margaret Thatcher’s 
governments made were necessary.
.894
Margaret Thatcher was right to take on trade unions. .805
Margaret Thatcher only looked after the interests of the rich. -.716
Today’s housing crisis is a result of selling off so many council homes in the 1980s. -.467
We fielded a further set of questions which gauged respondents’ feelings of nostalgia (differentiating 
between social, economic and political forms of nostalgia, see Figures Five to Seven). 
FIGURE FIVE: SOCIAL NOSTALGIA BATTERY
Item Wording Loadings
The country’s best days are behind it. .466
I would like my country to be the way it used to be. .711
More and more, I don’t like with what my country has become. .609
These days I feel like a stranger in my own country. .704
I feel sad when I think about how areas like the … one I grew up in have changed. .837
                                                                                     … one I now live in have changed. .813
The Social Nostalgia battery was factor analysed; the KMO was .837, and the eigenvalue was 3.450.  
The Economic Nostalgia battery had a KMO of .722, with an eigenvalue of 2.105, whilst the KMO for 
the Political Nostalgia battery was .765, and the eigenvalue 2.612.
FIGURE SIX: ECONOMIC NOSTALGIA BATTERY
Item Wording Loadings
The profit motive has come to dominate all aspects of our society. .607
The reliance on market forces has increased the gap between rich and poor. .632
It feels to me like the country lost something when coal mines, steel mills and 
shipyards closed.
.585
I feel that there has been a loss of community spirit around here since the 1980s. .609

































































FIGURE SEVEN: POLITICAL NOSTALGIA BATTERY
Item Wording Loadings
Margaret Thatcher’s governments decreased the quality of life for many ordinary 
people. 
.908
Margaret Thatcher’s governments did a lot of damage to communities around 
here. 
.889
Many of the problems we now face started in the 1980s with Margaret Thatcher. .897
3.2: Operationalising Key Socio-Demographic Variables
In order to assess which social groups expressed the highest levels of Thatcherite Values and Desires, 
we asked our respondents a series of questions aimed at assessing their age, gender, past voting 
patterns, parental voting and so on. These are listed here (along with their recoding, when 
appropriate, Figure Eight). 
3.3: Analytic Strategy
Our analytic strategy was to undertake multiple linear regressions in order to build models to explain 
the three Thatcherite desires and the Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative measures of Thatcherism.  
The Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative values are used as independent variables in the modelling of 
the desire to own a business, privately educate one’s children and own one’s home.  
FIGURE EIGHT: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS
Item Wording Notes
Please can you tell me your age at your last birthday? Recoded into 10 year intervals 16-25 
to +75.
What is your gender? Male/Female
Which of these best describes the ownership of your home? A range of tenures were offered. 
Those with mortgages and those 
who owned outright were treated as 
home owners.
Did you, or the person responsible for the mortgage, buy 
your present home from the local authority as a tenant? 
and 
Have you, or the person responsible for the mortgage, ever 
bought any previous home from the local authority as a 
tenant?
Those who said ‘Yes’ to either one of 
these were counted as council house 
buyers. 
How did you vote at the EU Referendum? Leave or remain (DK and can’t recall 
were excluded from the analyses).
You indicated that you voted at the previous General 
Election held in June 2017. How did you vote at the 
election? 
Coded as Conservatives, Labour, 
Liberal Democrats, SNP, Plaid Cymru, 
UKIP, Green Party, Other with DK 
and can’t recall offer as options. 
Can you remember which party your father voted for when 
you were growing up?
Respondents were offered the 
following: Conservative, Labour, 


































































Can you remember which party your mother voted for 
when you were growing up?
Liberal Party/Liberal Democrats/SDP, 
SNP, Plaid Cymru, Green Party, UKIP, 
British National Party, National 
Front, Other, Varied, Not brought up 
in Britain, Did not vote, Can’t 
remember, DK, refused. 
These were recoded into: 
Conservative; Labour; Liberal 
Party/Liberal Democrats/SDP/Green 
Party; SNP/Plaid Cymru; UKIP/British 
National Party/National Front; 
Other/Varied/Not brought up in 
Britain/Did not vote/Can’t 
remember/DK/refused.
When you were growing up, would you say your family was 
middle class or working class? 
Respondents were offered Middle 
Class, Working Class, Other and DK 
(the last two of which are dropped 
from analyses. 
Would you describe yourself as extremely religious or 
extremely non-religious? 
Respondents were offered the 
following: Extremely, Very, 
Somewhat, Neither Somewhat non, 
Very non-, Extremely non-, Can’t 
choose.
Which of all of the following income brackets, best 
represents your household income, before deductions for 
income tax, National Insurance etc. 
Respondents were offered £5,000 
bands ranging from Less than £5,000 
to  More than £100,000 with an 
option to select Prefer not to say.
Do you have a Bachelor’s degree or higher (e.g. BSc, BA, 
MA, MSc, PhD etc)?
Respondents could select Yes or No.
4: Regression Modelling
The data relating to Thatcherite desires (home ownership etc.) were used as dependent variables in 
their raw form (a 5 point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strong Agree). In 
order to retain as many cases as possible for analyses, we recoded those people who already owned 
their own businesses, wanted to educate their children privately or to own their own homes as ‘6’ 
(with the exception of those without children aged over 19, who were dropped from the analyses for 
the education question). Our logic being that ownership of a home was the realisation of the desire 
to own a home, and as such scored higher (6) than the highest level of desire to own (5). These 
models are reported in Table One). This exercise was repeated for the Neo-Liberal and Neo-
Conservative values (outlined in Figures One and Two). All of the models start with socio-
demographic variables, before introducing variables relating to values and beliefs.8
8 We ought to note that none of the variables appeared to suffer from multi-collinearity. 

































































4.1: Modelling Thatcherite Desires
We find, for example, that males are more likely than females to want to own their own business, 
but females are more likely to want to own their own homes (Table One). Older age groups are less 
likely to want to own their own business or to educate their children privately than younger age 
groups, who, in turn are less likely to want to own their own homes. There are either no statistically 
significant findings or no clear trends in the data for urban/rural dwellers (rural dwellers want to 
own their own businesses more than urban dwellers, however), religiosity, being the chief income 
earner (CIE, who are less likely to want to their own homes), or household income (although higher 
earning households are more likely to want to own their own homes). Those who had bought their 
local authority homes wanted to privately educate their children, whilst the reverse was true for 
those who described themselves as middle class whilst growing up. Those people with degrees were 
more likely than those without to want to own their own business and to educate their children 
privately. Home ownership was not associated with any of the Thatcherite desires. 
[TABLE ONE]
The variables relating to past voting patterns (either by the respondent or their parents) showed 
inconsistent patterns. None were statistically significant when it came to the model of desires to 
own a business. Those whose mothers had voted Conservative were more likely to want to privately 
educate their children, whilst those who fathers had voted Labour were less likely to want to buy 
their own homes. Of particular significance he e is the finding that few of the variables appear to 
help explain the desires to own one’s own home. This was a core Thatcherite aspiration in the 1980s. 
However, over time it has become a much more commonly-held and normalised aspiration. The 
power of explanatory variables to account for it is, as a consequence, all the weaker.  
Moving on to political values and beliefs, the measure of Neo-Liberalism (outlined in Figure One 
above) was positively associated with the desire to own one’s own business and to educate one’s 
children privately (as one might imagine, as were Thatcherite Beliefs). It was not, however, 
associated with wanting to own one’s home as this was so prevalent (see above). Neo-Conservative 
values (outlined in Figure Two above) were negatively associated with wanting to own one’s own 
business. Of the nostalgia batteries, only that relating to Political Nostalgia (Figure Seven) was 
related to any of the Thatcherite desires (being positively associated with wanting to own one’s own 
business and educate one’s children privately).
What lessons can we draw from the multiple linear regressions in Table One? Let us start with the 
socio-demographic variables. Rural dwellers association with desires to own their own businesses 
could represent a middle class ‘flight’ to rural homes. In terms of gender, it would appear that males 
have bought the Thatcherite desire of ‘being one’s own boss’ (separate analyses found that men 
were more likely than females to own their own businesses), whilst females were more likely to 
want to own their own homes. Perhaps more the most interesting findings again relate to younger 
people. We find younger people wanting to own their own businesses, to educate their children 
privately, and to own their own homes. Those educated to degree level held consistently pro-
Thatcherite desires. Turning now to the theoretical variables, one sees that none of these predict 
desires to own one’s home; indicating both the prevalence of such desires. Owning one’s own 
business is positively associated with higher levels of Neo-Liberalism, higher levels of Thatcherite 
Beliefs and higher levels of Political Nostalgia for the Thatcher period (as one might imagine). Neo-

































































Conservative values are negatively associated with wanting to own one’s own home. This picture is 
largely replicated (without the Neo-Conservative values) when we look at the desire to educate 
one’s children privately.        
In terms of the models of Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative values (Table Two), we find quite 
contrasting models. In terms of explaining Neo-Liberalism, being younger, less religious, the Chief 
income earner in a household, and a local authority home buyer were all associated with having 
higher Neo-Liberal values. Voting for a left-leaning party was negatively associated with Neo-Liberal 
values (as one would expect).9 Whilst feelings of Social Nostalgia, Political Nostalgia and Thatcherite 
Beliefs were all positively associated with Neo-Liberalism, Economic Nostalgia was negatively 
associated with Neo-Liberalism (neo-liberals are less economically nostalgic, but more socially, 
politically nostalgic and hold Thatcherite Beliefs). In terms of explaining Neo-Conservativism, those 
in households with higher incomes were more likely to hold Neo-Conservative values, whilst those 
with degree were less likely to hold Neo-Conservative Values. Having voted to leave the EU was 
associated with Neo-Conservativism, whilst voting for a left-leaning political party was not. Feelings 
of both Social and Economic Nostalgia were associated with Neo-Conservativism. 
[TABLE TWO]
5: Reputational Legacies?
One of the things which we also wished to establish was the extent to which popular opinion was 
supportive of Margaret Thatcher’s period in office in terms of her reputation. When she left office in 
November 1990, MORI asked people if, on balance, they thought that Thatcher’s governments had 
been a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ thing. We repeated this question in our survey in January/February 2019. 
The data for both are presented in Table Three.






Good 52 24 -28
Bad 40 37 -3
No Opinion 8 38 +30
Good-Bad Difference +12 -13 -
  All figures are column percentages. 
In November 1990, some 52% of the MORI survey felt that Thatcher’s governments had been a good 
thing (a +12% Good/Bad rating). This had dropped by some 28 percentage points at the point of our 
survey to 24% (a -13% Good/Bad rating). On the other hand, those thinking that her governments 
had been a bad thing had dropped by only three percentage points to 37%. Understandably, the 
percentage of those with no opinion had risen more than fourfold to 38%.
9 Left-leaning parties were defined as Labour, The Liberal Democrats, the SNP, Plaid Cymru and the Greens. 
The opposite (right-leanings parties) were defined as the Conservative Party and UKIP.  

































































TABLE FOUR: REPUTATIONAL LEGACY OF THATCHER/ISM BY AGE
16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 +75
Good 15 21 27 32 38 49 52
Bad 39 37 41 47 46 36 33
No Opinion 46 42 32 22 16 15 15
All figures are column percentages. 
As can be seen (Table Four), the percentage of people reporting Thatcher’s governments as being 
‘good’ increases with age from a low of 15% for those aged 16-24, to 52% for those aged over 75. 
The ‘bad’ ratings do not vary much, ranging from 33% to 47%. This is a fairly linear increase of about 
six percentage points for ages 16-64, thereafter jumping to 11 percentage points. Notably, the 
highest levels of ‘bad’ assessments come from those aged 45 to 64 (born 1955 to 1974, and aged 16 
to 35 when she left office). This group would have been amongst those whose life-courses would 
have been most affected by her government’s policies (see Farrall et al, 2019a, b and 2020a, for 
example). Those with the most positive assessments are those aged over 65 (so born before 1955, 
and hence aged at least 24 when Thatcher was elected in 1979). This group is the age cohort most 
likely to have gained from policies such as the right to buy one’s council home and lower taxes on 
salaries for those in work). As one might expect the ‘no opinion’ assessment decreases with age.    
Another way of assessing what people feel about Thatcherism today is to ask if the changes her 
government initiated ‘went too far’, ‘were about right’ or ‘did not go far enough’. Table Five 
summarises this data. What we see is that the 45-64-year-old groups again stand out as least 
supportive of her governments’ policies; th y alone reach 60% for the ‘went too far’ response 
(shaded cells), and they score the lowest on the ‘did not go far enough’ response (lighter shaded 
cells). Interestingly, ‘about right’ was most popular with those over 65.
TABLE FIVE: DID THATCHER ‘GO TOO FAR?’ BY AGE
16-24 24-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-75 Over 
75
Went too far 52 55 57 62 60 47 46
About right 36 36 36 32 35 46 48
Did not go far enough 12 10 7 6 5 7 7
 All figures are %s
6: Discussion and Conclusions
Where does this leave us? Who holds Thatcherite Values in the early 2020s, forty years after 
Thatcher won her first General Election? And who promotes these values today? Age is negatively 
related to all three of the desires, and Neo-Liberal Values, suggesting that (contrary to some 
expectations) younger people are more Thatcherite than older people in the values they express. 
Similarly, religiosity is also negatively related to wanting to run (or already running) one’s own 
business and to privately educate one’s children (or to do so already), and with Neo-Liberal Values 
too. Those with higher household incomes are more likely already to own or to want to own their 
own businesses, to want to or already to own their own home, and to report Neo-Conservative 

































































Values.  Those with degrees are more likely than those without already to run their own business (or 
to want to), to privately educate their children (or to already do so) and they are more likely to hold 
Neo-Conservative Values. Those who bought their local authority homes either want to (or already) 
privately educate their children; they tend also to express Neo-Liberal Values. People who voted for 
left-leaning parties in 2017 score lower, as one might imagine than those who voted for right-leaning 
parties on both the measures of Neo-Liberalism and Neo-Conservativism. Both Thatcherite Beliefs 
and holding Neo-Liberal Values are associated with desires to run one’s own business and to educate 
one’s children privately (or already doing so). The nostalgia batteries predict (in various pairings) 
support for all of the measures of Thatcherite Desires and Values, with the exception of home 
ownership. 
The variables which do not feature prominently in the five regression models (appearing only once 
or twice if at all) relate to gender, area of dwelling (urban or rural), being the chief income earner, 
being a home owner, being middle class when a child, reported parental voting behaviour and EU 
Referendum voting. It is these last sets of variables (unassociated with Thatcherism) which, we 
contend, offer some intriguing clues when it comes to answering the question of who holds 
Thatcherite values today. Home ownership in the UK has reached such high rates of saturation that 
very few of the variables we used were are associated with it, and when used as an independent 
variable, it fails to predict either Neo-Liberalism or Neo-Conservativism. This suggests, in keeping 
with our argument, that some Thatcherite values and desires have become embedded in UK society 
(Farrall et al, forthcoming). Although home ownership was once a core part of that Thatcherite 
dream for the aspiration working class, it is now a much more commonly held and normalised desire 
(a routine expectation).  In part this suggests the value structures Thatcherism promoted were the 
‘right’ ones – which appealed to people’s desires. However, in another way it also reflects the fact 
that many of our local authority owned housing estates are no longer places many people would 
‘aspire’ to reside in for the long-term (Farrall et al 2016). Moreover, that parental voting is unrelated 
to Thatcherism suggests that any intergenerational voting bloc has been eroded. In general, younger 
people, in households with higher incomes, who have degrees and report lower levels of religious 
belief are likely to hold Thatcherite Values. Local Authority home purchasers want to privately 
educate their children (or have already done so) and to hold Neo-Liberal Values.     
In some cases, however, the data in Tables Three to Five suggest a dislike for Thatcher and her 
governments’ time in office. However, Thatcher and Thatcherism are different beasts, and whilst the 
terms ‘Thatcher’ and ‘Thatcherism’ have become unpopular, negatively connoted, and associated 
with a turbulent period in the UK’s recent history, the actual values and desires which Thatcher 
promoted have become embedded in British society, especially so amongst younger members of 
society. In this way, one could see Thatcher has having ‘lost the (discursive) battle, but won the 
(ideological) war’. 
Our study is not a study of political discourses, and as such we are unable to reflect on which 
sections of society or systems of political thought and control ‘advance’ the sorts of arguments 
which underpin and buttress ‘Thatcherite’ attitudes.  However, the recent work of French scholars 
Dardot and Laval (2013) gives some clues. Their work attempts to understand the ways in which ‘the 
neoliberal project’ (and hence for us a key part of the Thatcherite project) has shaped both society 
and the key social actors within it. They argue that neoliberalism is: 
“productive of certain kinds of social relations, certain ways of living, certain subjectivities. In 
other words, at stake in neo-liberalism is nothing more, nor less, than the form of our 
existence – the way in which we are led to conduct ourselves, to relate to others and 
ourselves” (2013:3). 

































































The principal characteristic of neo-liberalism is what they term ‘competitive behaviouralism’ (p4).  
Drawing on Foucault they claim that neoliberalism is a form of ‘government of life’ (p4-5), and as 
such not simply as a set of prescriptions about economics or economic policy, but also a societal 
form (p11).  Their insights into politically-induced attitudinal behavioural change suggests that this 
project has produced a new human condition (p255), and the attitudes and values needed to survive 
in it. In that sense, all social actors are involved in the reproduction of these values which over time, 
become norm (such as the desire to own one’s own home, above). Some (such as politicians, for 
example) will have louder voices which reach further and who are able to establish and promote 
particular agendas. As such, individuals, organisations and institutions will work consciously or 
unconsciously to reproduce and promote the values associated with Thatcherism and neo-liberalism 
more generally. Alongside this, argue Dardot and Laval, private insurance replaces socialised health 
care, pension and welfare schemes – as the field of action of the ‘responsible’, ‘choosing’ neoliberal 
subject grows and competitive individualism becomes institutionally embedded (p277). US political 
scientist Pierson argues in a similar vein that:
“Policies may encourage individuals to develop particular skills, make certain kinds of 
investments, purchase certain kinds of goods, or devote time and money to certain kinds of 
organizations” (1993:609).
He notes that “public policies also provide resources and create incentives for mass publics” 
(1993:605).  In keeping with Dardot and Laval, Pierson highlights the ways in which social and 
economic policies shape what people want and are capable of achieving. As such, these attitudes 
emerge from the contexts in which individuals live and orientate their lives and goals (Emirbayer and 
Mische, 1998). 
One of the limitations of our study is that it is based on cross-sectional data. However, what we 
know from the work of Grasso et al (2019a and b) and Gray et al (2019) is that those people who 
grew up under the Thatcher and Major governments, and subsequently the Blair government, do 
appear to hold values which are in keeping with Thatcherite ideology and discourse, and more so 
than earlier generations. However, when asked about their feelings toward Thatcher, we find that 
they are much less keen to embrace ideas that might be seen to bear her name and, by extension, 
less keen to identify themselves with her or Thatcherism (Table Four). This, we surmise, is because 
these individuals hold values which they developed whilst they were growing up (during the Blair 
era, when such values had become more normalised and relatively unchallenged [an empirical 
confirmation, in effect, of the argument advanced in Hay 2004]).  As such, they appear to embrace 
ideas whose origins seem to lie in the Thatcher years, without thinking of them in such terms. In 
some respects, then, these individuals hold ‘Thatcherite’ values (as we have demonstrated 
empirically) but do not to think of themselves as Thatcherite (exhibiting a form of what might be 
termed political cognitive dissonance). There are, nevertheless, a small percent of younger 
respondents who felt that the changes her government brought in did not go far enough (around 10-
12% for those aged 16-34, Table Five). Those aged 45-64 (and arguably those whose life-courses 
would have been most dramatically altered by Thatcherite policies) consistently appear to be the 
least positive about her time in office. This, perhaps, shows the importance and slow-burning nature 
of political socialisation. For those aged under 45, neo-liberalism was already the norm when they 
were being socialised (between 1975 and 2003). For them, expressing neo-liberal values is to express 
or take a position on questions that had become depoliticised and less contested than previously so.  
So, in effect, these are Blair’s babies as much as they are Thatcher’s children. 
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Table One: Multiple Linear Regression Models of Thatcherite Desires
Shaded cells are statistically significant and only included to aid readability. *Tenure was not included in the model for Home Ownership.  

























Constant 5.272 .276 - .000 5.579 .458 - .000 5.441 .321 - .000
Female -.290 .059 -.094 .000 -.087 .098 -.028 .374 .052 .069 .020 .456
Age -.035 .002 -.378 .000 -.016 .003 -.179 .000 -.039 .002 -.502 .000
Rural Dweller .201 .071 .051 .005 -.016 118 -.004 .893 -.026 .084 -.008 .756
Religiosity -.075 .019 -.071 .000 -.140 .032 -.133 .000 -.029 .023 -.033 .195
Chief Earner .046 .063 .014 .470 .204 .105 .064 .052 -.096 .074 -.035 .197
Household income .024 .009 .055 .008 -.010 .015 .022 .526 .055 .010 .147 .000
Degree educated .152 .062 .468 .014 .562 .103 .179 .000 .101 .073 -.038 .164
Home Owners -.060 .065 -.019 .355 .101 .107 .032 .349 - - - -*
LA home buyer .129 .093 .025 .166 .912 .154 .180 .000 -.045 .108 -.010 .677
Middle class as child -.027 .041 -.012 .509 -.185 .068 -.084 .007 -.024 .048 -.013 .613
Father voted Con -.076 .103 -.021 .457 -.313 .170 -.085 .066 -.025 .120 -.008 .838
Father voted Lab -.022 .088 -.007 .801 -.103 .146 -.033 .481 -.262 .104 -.097 .012
Mother voted Con .170 .102 .046 .094 .361 .169 .099 .032 .037 .119 .012 .757
Mother voted Lab -.008 .088 -.003 .925 .084 .146 .026 .566 .157 .104 .058 .130
Voted Left-leaning .007 .075 .002 .928 -.016 .125 -.005 .897 -.066 .088 -.025 .458
Voted to leave EU .011 .065 .003 .871 .129 .107 .042 .228 .110 .076 .042 .147
Neo-Liberal Values .136 .045 .075 .002 .234 .074 .129 .002 -.102 .052 -..066 .052
Neo-Con Values -.181 .041 -.104 .000 -.127 .068 -.074 .062 .020 .048 .013 .681
Thatcherite Beliefs .143 .055 .089 .009 .753 .091 .473 .000 .114 .064 .084 .076
Social Nostalgia .080 .039 .049 .040 -.007 .064 -.004 .917 -.036 .046 -.026 .426
Economic Nostalgia .033 .046 .018 .473 .108 .077 .059 .161 .102 .054 .066 .061
Political Nostalgia .128 .053 .080 .016 .448 .088 .282 .000 -.074 .062 -.055 .235
Adj. R-Sq .191 .304 .315
































































Table Two: Multiple Linear Regression Models of Thatcherite Values
Shaded cells are statistically significant and only included to aid readability. *These variables were not included in these models.  

















Constant .725 .124 - .000 .031 .135 - .816
Female -.045 .027 -.026 .093 .026 .029 .015 .367
Age -.002 .001 -.042 .016 .001 .001 .028 .127
Rural Dweller .003 .032 .001 .936 .026 .035 .011 .460
Religiosity -.036 .009 -.062 .000 .007 .009 .012 .457
Chief Earner .060 .029 .034 .037 .056 .031 .030 .074
Household income .005 .004 .021 .211 .011 .004 .042 .018
Degree educated .014 .028 .008 .615 -.189 .030 -.104 .000
Home Owners .014 .029 -.008 .643 .059 .032 .033 .063
LA home buyer .134 .042 .048 .001 .022 .046 .007 .633
Middle class as child -.010 .019 -.009 .575 .008 .020 .007 .679
Father voted Con .007 .046 .003 .880 .014 .051 .006 .787
Father voted Lab .008 .040 .004 .849 .068 .043 .037 .119
Mother voted Con -.002 .046 -.001 .973 -.040 .050 -.019 .419
Mother voted Lab .045 .040 .026 .261 -.011 .043 -.006 .802
Voted Left-leaning -.231 .034 -.136 .000 -.191 .037 -.108 .000
Voted to leave EU -.015 .029 -.009 .614 -.225 .032 -.127 .000
Thatcherite Beliefs .559 .022 .634 .000 .221 .024 .241 .000
Social Nostalgia .149 .016 .165 .000 .360 .018 .382 .000
Economic Nostalgia -.226 .020 -.224 .000 .137 .022 .130 .000
Political Nostalgia .206 .024 .234 .000 .020 .026 .022 .439
Adj. R-Sq .453 .405
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